Abstract: Following the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States, world public awareness for possible terrorist attacks on water supply systems has increased dramatically. Among the different threats for a water distribution system, the most difficult to address is a deliberate chemical or biological contaminant injection, due to both the uncertainty of the type of injected contaminant and its consequences, and the uncertainty of the time and location of the injection. An online contaminant monitoring system is considered as a major opportunity to protect against the impacts of a deliberate contaminant intrusion. However, although optimization models and solution algorithms have been developed for locating sensors, little is known about how these design algorithms compare to the efforts of
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Introduction
Since the early days of King Hezekiah ͑late eighth to early seventh centuries BCE͒, who constructed a 533-m underground tunnel to channel the Gihon Spring outside Jerusalem into the city as part of his war against Sennacherib, water resources systems were the subject of threats and conflicts throughout history with diverse intensities ͑Gleick 1998͒. Related water terrorist activities were reported in ancient Rome, in the United States during its Civil War, in Europe and Asia during World War II, and in 1999 in Kosovo. Hickman ͑1999͒ and Deininger and Meier ͑2000͒ discussed the topic of deliberate contamination of water supply systems.
For the last decade there has been increasing interest in the development of sensor networks to cope with both deliberate and accidental hazard's intrusions into water distribution systems. Optimization models and solution algorithms have been developed for identifying the most efficient sensor locations. These optimization models and solution algorithms have involved simplifying assumptions about design objectives, network contaminant transport, sensor response, event detection, emergency response, installation and maintenance costs, etc. Little is known about how these design algorithms compare from one design methodology to another, and thus, what advantages they provide for practical design of sensor networks. To explore these issues, the Battle of the Water Sensor Networks ͑BWSN͒ was held ͑Ostfeld et al. 2006͒ as part of the Eigth Annual Water Distribution Systems Analysis Symposium, in Cincinnati, on August 27-29, 2006.
The BWSN was aimed at objectively comparing the performance of contributed sensor network designs, as applied to two water distribution systems examples. Fifteen independent research groups and practicing engineers contributed their designs. All the teams were asked to develop designs according to a set of rules, which defined the design performance metrics and the characteristics of the contamination events. Teams were free to develop their designs and methodologies, yet, for comparison, all outcome designs were evaluated using identical procedures.
The objective of this paper is to summarize the outcome of the BWSN effort and to highlight future directions for water sensor networks research. The following describes: ͑1͒ the BWSN design objectives; ͑2͒ design assumptions and cases; ͑3͒ a synopsis of the teams' design approaches; ͑4͒ a comparison of the design results; and ͑5͒ conclusions and future research directions.
Design Objectives
Contributed sensor network designs were evaluated using the following four quantitative design objectives:
Expected Time of Detection "Z 1 … For a particular contamination scenario, the time of detection by a sensor is the elapsed time from the start of the contamination event, to the first identified presence of a nonzero contaminant concentration. The time of first detection, t j , refers to the jth sensor location. The time of detection for the sensor network for a particular contamination event, t d , is the minimum among all sensors present in the design
The objective function to be minimized is the expected value computed over the assumed probability distribution of contamination events
where E͑t d ͒ denotes the mathematical expectation of the minimum detection time t d . Since undetected events had no detection times, they were not included in the analysis. This acknowledged limitation pertains to all of the design objectives and is discussed later in the paper.
Expected Population Affected prior to Detection "Z 2 …
For a specific contamination scenario, the population affected is a function of the ingested contaminant mass. The ingested contaminant mass, in turn, depends on the time of detection for the sensor network, as described above; two key assumptions are that no mass is ingested after detection and that all mass ingested during undetected events is not counted. For a particular contamination scenario, the mass ingested-prior to detection-by any individual at network node i is
where = mean amount of water consumed by an individual ͑L/ day/person͒; ⌬t = evaluation time step ͑days͒; c ik = contaminant concentration for node i and time step k ͑mg/L͒; ik = " dose rate multiplier" ͑Murray et al. 2006͒ for node i and time step k ͑unitless͒; and N = number of evaluation time steps prior to detection, i.e., the largest integer such that N⌬t ഛ t d . The series ik , k = 1 , . . . ,N has a mean of 1 ͑so, is truly the mean volumetric ingestion rate͒ and is intended to model the variation in ingestion rate throughout the day. It is assumed that the ingestion rate varies with the water demand rate at the respective node, thus
where q ik = water demand for time step k and node i; and q i = average water demand at node i.
A dose-response model ͑Chick et al. 2001, 2003͒ is used to express the probability that any person ingesting mass M i will be affected ͑i.e., becomes infected or symptomatic͒
where R i = probability ͓0, 1͔ that a person who ingests contaminant mass M i will become infected or symptomatic; ␤ = so-called Probit slope parameter ͑unitless͒; W = assumed ͑aver-age͒ body mass ͑kg/person͒; D 50 = dose that would result in a 0.5 probability of becoming infected or symptomatic ͑mg/kg͒; and ⌽ = standard normal cumulative distribution function. The population affected, P a , for a particular contamination scenario is calculated as
where P i = population assigned to node i; and V = total number of nodes. The objective function to be minimized is the expected value of P a computed over the assumed probability distribution of contamination events
where E͑P a ͒ denotes the mathematical expectation of the affected population P a .
Expected Consumption of Contaminated Water prior to Detection "Z 3 … Z 3 = expected volume of contaminated water consumed prior to detection
where V d denotes the total volumetric water demand that exceeds a predefined hazard concentration threshold C; and E͑V d ͒ = mathematical expectation of V d . As for the expected population affected, key assumptions are that no water is delivered after detection and undetected events are not counted. Z 3 ͑as Z 2 and Z 1 ͒ is to be minimized.
Detection likelihood "Z 4 …
Given a sensor network design ͑i.e., number and locations͒ the detection likelihood ͑i.e., the probability of detection͒ is estimated by
where d r = 1 if contamination scenario r is detected, and zero otherwise; and S denotes the total number of the contamination scenarios considered. Z 4 is to be maximized. The variables that constitute the design objectives are subject to right censoring as a result of the finite-simulation durations used to compute their values ͑96 h for the small network; 48 h for the large network͒. The variable that is directly censored is the time to detection, t d , which cannot exceed the difference between the end of the simulation period and the start of the contamination event ͑that is, there are varying censoring times for t d , depending on when the event begins͒. The other variables: population affected prior to detection ͑P a ͒; the demand of contaminated water prior to detection ͑V d ͒; and the detection indicator variable ͑d r ͒; are all co-censored along with t d , although not by an amount that can be determined a priori by knowing the start time of the contamination event and the duration of the simulation period. In addition, as noted below, the expectations for these variables ͑Z 1 -Z 4 ͒ were computed in this study using only the events that were detected. As such, the random variables were in fact truncated ͑rather than censored͒, introducing an even greater downward bias in the computed values of their expectations. While this truncation was viewed as the only feasible approach for implementing this evaluation, approaches that explicitly recognize the censoring caused by finite-simulation durations are considered in the concluding section, which addresses future research needs.
Design Assumptions and Cases
Participants were asked to provide designs for locating five sensors and 20 sensors for a base case ͑A͒ and three derivative cases ͑B, C, and D͒ using EPANET Version 2.00.10 ͑http://www. epa.gov/ORD/NRML/wswrd/epanet.html͒. The four cases are described below.
Base Case A 1. All quantities affecting network model water quality predictions were assumed to be known and deterministic. Sensor network designs were challenged by an ensemble of contamination scenarios sampled from a statistical distribution; the probability distribution of contamination events is described herein. Contaminant intrusions occurred at network nodes, with an injection flow rate of 125 L / h, contaminant concentration of 230,000 mg/ L, and injection duration of 2 h. The contaminant was assumed conservative after injection. Each contamination scenario involved a single injection location, which may occur at any network node and begin at any time with equal probability. For purposes of design evaluation, contaminant concentrations were evaluated using a 5-min time step. 2. For purposes of calculating the expected population affected prior to detection ͑Z 2 ͒: =2 L/ day, ␤ = 0.34 ͑-͒, D 50 =41 mg/ kg, and W = 70 kg. For purposes of estimating node population, the total per capita water demand rate was assumed to be 300 L / day. 3. For purposes of calculating the expected demand of contaminated water prior to detection ͑Z 3 ͒, the hazard concentration threshold was C = 0.3 mg/ L. 4. Sensors instantly detected any nonzero contaminant concentration and action was taken to eliminate further exposure without delay.
Derivative Case B
Identical to Base Case A except that the injection duration was increased to 10 h.
Derivative Case C
Identical to Base Case A except that the response delay was 3 h, i.e., it took 3 h after detection for emergency response to limit contaminant exposure.
Derivative Case D
Identical to Base Case A except that all contamination scenarios involved two injection locations, which may occur at any two distinct nodes with equal probability. The contamination scenario may begin at any time with equal probability, but both injections were synchronized to begin at the same time.
Design Approaches
Fifteen sensor designs were submitted to the BWSN. This section gives a brief description of each contribution. Alzamora and Ayala ͑2006͒ suggested a general framework for sensor locations using topological algorithms. Berry et al. ͑2006͒ proposed a p-median formulation adapted from discrete location theory to define the sensors location problem, which was further solved using a heuristic method. Dorini et al. ͑2006͒ suggested a constrained multiobjective optimization framework entitled the noisy cross-entropy sensor locator ͑nCESL͒ algorithm, which is based on the cross-entropy methodology proposed by Rubinstein ͑1999͒. Eliades and Polycarpou ͑2006͒ proposed a multiobjective solution, using an "iterative deepening of Pareto solutions" algorithm. Ghimire and Barkdoll ͑2006a,b͒ suggested a heuristic demand-based approach in which sensors were located at the junctions with the highest demands ͑Ghimire and Barkdoll 2006a͒, or the highest mass released ͑Ghimire and Barkdoll 2006b͒. Guan et al. ͑2006͒ proposed a genetic algorithm simulation-optimization methodology based on a single objective function approach in which the four quantitative design objectives were embedded. Gueli ͑2006͒ suggested a predator-prey model applied to multiobjective optimization, based on an evolution process. Huang et al. ͑2006͒ proposed a multiobjective genetic algorithm framework coupled with data mining. Krause et al. ͑2006͒ applied a greedy algorithm for the sensors locations, noting that a limitation in the BWSN formulation was that the Z i ͑i =1,2,3͒ objectives were being evaluated against only the scenarios that were detected, thus not considering the effects of the undetected scenarios, which might be critical. Ostfeld and Salomons ͑2006͒ and Preis and Ostfeld ͑2006͒ used the multiobjective nondominated sorted genetic algorithm-II ͑NSGA-II͒ ͑Deb et al. 2000͒ scheme. Propato and Piller ͑2006͒ used a mixed-integer linear program to solve the sensors' locations. Trachtman ͑2006͒ suggested an engineering "strawman" approach for locating the sensors taking into consideration factors such as population distribution, system pressure and flow patterns, critical customer locations, etc. Wu and Walski ͑2006͒ used a multiobjective optimization formulation, which was solved using a genetic algorithm, with the contamination events randomly generated using a Monte Carlo scheme.
Case Studies
Two water distribution systems of increasing complexity were used for the designs.
Network 1 ͑Fig. 1͒ was comprised of 126 nodes, one constant head source, two tanks, 168 pipes, two pumps, eight valves, and was subject to four variable demand patterns. The system was simulated for a total extended period duration of 96 h.
Network 2 ͑Fig. 2͒ had 12,523 nodes, two constant head sources, two tanks, 14,822 pipes, four pumps, five valves, and was subject to five variable demand patterns. The system was simulated for a total extended period duration of 48 h.
Both networks were real water distribution systems that were "twisted" to preserve their anonymity. Space limitation prohibits the description of all of their details ͑e.g., pipe lengths, base de- mands, diameters, and elevations͒. The network's EPANET input files can be downloaded from the Exeter Centre for Water Systems ͑ECWS͒ ͑http://www.exeter.ac.uk/cws/bwsn͒.
Design Results
A methodology for evaluating a given sensor design should comply with two basic requirements: ͑1͒ it should be objective, and ͑2͒ it should assess a design regardless of the method used to receive it; thus, solutions from academia, practitioners, utilities, etc., all would be assessed on the same basis. To accomplish this task, a utility was developed by Salomons ͑2006͒.
The utility was comprised of two stages: ͑1͒ generation of a matrix of contamination injection events in either of two mechanisms: random, using Monte Carlo-type simulations selected by the user; or deterministic, injection at each node each 5 min, and ͑2͒ evaluation of Z i ͑i =1, ... ,4͒ according to the matrix of contamination injection events constructed in Stage 1.
The utility was distributed to all participants prior to the Berry et al. ͑2006͒ 3, 4, 17, 21, 25, 31, 34, 37, 46, 64, 68, 81, 82, 90, 98, 102, 116, 118, 122, 126 287 68 408 0.770 Dorini et al. ͑2006͒ 0, 10, 14, 17, 31, 34, 39, 45, 49, 68, 74, 82, 83, 90, 100, 102, 114, 122, 124, 128 408 72 642 0.855 Eliades and Polycarpou ͑2006͒ 10, 11, 14, 17, 19, 21, 31, 35, 45, 68, 74, 83, 90, 100, 102, 114, 118, 123, 124, 126 368 96 969 0.893 Ghimire and Barkdoll ͑2006a͒ 126, 30, 118, 102, 34, 17, 58, 68, 93, 27, 42, 82, 45, 35, 83, 89, 99, 70, 18, 32 377 104 750 0.792 Ghimire and Barkdoll ͑2006b͒ 126, 30, 102, 118, 58, 68, 17, 93, 82, 34, 99, 98, 89, 83, 100, 96, 70, 27, 32, 35 370 106 787 0.769 Guan et al. ͑2006͒ 4, 11, 17, 21, 27, 31, 34, 35, 46, 68, 75, 79, 82, 83, 98, 100, 102, 118, 122, 126 337 78 503 0.854 ͑2006͒ 112, 1, 103, 24, 21, 102, 35, 19, 116, 85, 61, 73, 114, 31, 7, 8, 64, 28, 93, 124 226 88 1,181 0.577 Huang et al. ͑2006͒ 8, 11, 42, 46, 52, 68, 70, 75, 76, 82, 83, 95, 97, 99, 100, 109, 111, 117, 123, 126 375 148 1,799 0.849 Krause et al. ͑2006͒ 17, 83, 122, 31, 45, 100, 11, 126, 68, 90, 21, 35, 34, 118, 123, 114, 124, 76, 10, 19 401 93 865 0.900 Ostfeld and Salomons ͑2006͒ 68, 5, 40, 65, 51, 69, 88, 89, 22, 72, 34, 71, 53, 112, 63, 78, 122, 28, 118, 97 198 115 1,039 0.647 Propato and Piller ͑2006͒ 11, 17, 34, 37, 38, 45, 49, 68, 76, 83, 90, 100, 102, 106, 114, 118, 123, 124, 125, 126 433 106 934 0.879 , 29, 102, 30, 20, 18, 58, 5, 3, 76, 98, 17, 126, 68, 93, 27, 42, 82, 46, 35 325 99 862 0.739 Wu and Walski ͑2006͒ 10, 12, 19, 21, 34, 35, 40, 45, 68, 75, 80, 83, 98, 100, 102, 114, 118 2006͒ , it became evident during the groups' design preparations and during the BWSN that the expected time of detection ͑Z 1 ͒, the expected population affected prior to detection ͑Z 2 ͒, and the expected demand of contaminated water prior to detection ͑Z 3 ͒, competed against the detection likelihood ͑Z 4 ͒; thus, the BWSN was inherently a multiobjective problem.
Gueli
In a multiobjective context the goal is to find, from all the possible feasible solutions, the set of nondominated solutions, where a nondominated solution is optimal in the sense that there is no other solution that dominates it ͑i.e., there is no other solution that is better than that solution with respect to all objectives͒.
This leads to two observations: ͑1͒ comparisons can be made on the Z i ͑i =1,2,3͒ versus Z 4 domains, and ͑2͒ a unique single optimal solution cannot be identified, thus a "winner" cannot be declared. It should also be emphasized in this context that alternate comparison methods could have been employed, thus there is no claim that the adopted comparison approach is better in an absolute sense than an alternative methodology. 
Krause et al. ͑2006͒ published Node identification ͑ID͒ numbers for all their solutions to the BWSN networks and scenarios. In the present work, the evaluation was based on junction ID. Thus, Krause et al. ͑2006͒ solutions were converted from node ID to junction ID. For Network 2, this is a simple offset of −1 to all node numbers. For Network 1 there are no junction numbers 107 and 108; therefore, junctions were offset −1 from nodes for those below 107 and +1 for those above 109. Tables 1 and 2 show the participants' detailed sensor designs for N1A5 Network 1, Base Case A, five sensors ͑N1A5͒, and for Network 1, Base Case A, 20 sensors ͑N1A20͒, respectively; It can be seen from Fig. 3 that most of the participant groups' solutions chose Node 83 as a sensor location, which is a downstream node of the system, and Nodes 68 and 118, at the southern and northern parts of the system, respectively. At those locations, most of the nondominated solutions ͑Fig. 4͒ were present.
Observing Fig. 4 , it can be seen that the relative locations on the Z i ͑i =1,2,3͒ -Z 4 plane of the different parties' solutions are alike and that the Z i objective functions are correlated ͑i.e., a nondominated solution obtained by a specific method would likely remain regardless of the objective function used͒. This is also evident in Fig. 5 . An improvement of the results can be It can be seen from Figs. 6-8 that similar patterns of solutions were received for Cases B and C, but significantly different for Case D. As Case D considers two simultaneous injections beginning at the same time, but at different random locations, the detection likelihood increased considerably, with all solutions having a detection likelihood of above 0.8 for 20 sensors. In most solutions the Z i ͑i =1,2,3͒ values were reduced for Case D, compared to Cases B and C.
In Fig. 9 , Z 2 versus Z 4 for N1A5 and for N1C5 are plotted for each of the group's solutions. It can be seen from Fig. 9 , as expected, that as the detection delay increased ͑Derivative Case C͒, the expected population affected prior to detection ͑Z 2 ͒ increased, for all the solutions.
Network 2
Tables 3 and 4 and Figs. 10 and 11 provide results for Network 2 for Base Case A. To evaluate Network 2, Base Case A ͑N2A͒, a randomized matrix of 25,054 events ͑two injections at each node of the system, at two random times͒ was generated. Each injection event simulation took about 2.1 min on an IBM PC 3.2 GHz, 1 GB RAM. Krause et al. ͑2006͒ noted that the full matrix of simulated results for Network 2 can be computed using parallel processing and optimized storage algorithms. Tables 3 and 4 Table 3 and Fig. 10͒ , which is nondominated, using different approaches.
It can be seen from Figs. 10 and 11 ͑and for Network 1 with Figs. 4 and 5͒, that the relative locations on the Z i ͑i =1,2,3͒ -Z 4 plane of the different solutions are similar; thus, the Z i objective functions are correlated. Compared to Network 1, the number of nondominated solutions was reduced considerably in Network 2.
There are an infinite number of intrusion scenarios possible on a water distribution system, due to varying durations, locations, etc. The BWSN utilized Cases B, C, and D as variations on Case A, but they were different. Table 5 provides a summary of the nondominated solutions received by the participant groups for all the explored cases as presented in Figs. 4-11 ͓e.g., Berry et al. ͑2004͒ obtained two nondominated solutions for N1A5, as shown in Fig. 4͔ . Krause et al. ͑2006͒ received the highest total number of 26 nondominated solutions for all the explored cases.
The BWSN results do not support the assumption that Case A is the most critical and a design that performs well in Case A would also do reasonably well in other cases. However, the BWSN results did prompt additional research, which indicated that for the two water distribution systems used in the BWSN, sensor networks based on Cases A, B, and C, were spatially similar. Due to this attribute, a sensor network design that performs well in Case A will also do reasonably well in Cases B and C ͑Isovitsch and VanBriesen 2008͒.
Observations

Nondetect Events
The evaluation of sensor design was made in the presence of a varied ensemble of contamination incidents. In real life, each of these incidents would play out over many days. Therefore, it was important that the hydraulic models be sufficiently calibrated to support extended period simulations, and that these should be used in the evaluation of any sensor design. Consider one such simulation. Regardless of the objective being evaluated, the contamination plume will propagate through the network until the simulation has run its course. If, at the end of the simulation, no sensor has experienced contamination, this condition is referred to as a "nondetection." In a large ensemble of potential incidents in a sizable network protected by a small number of sensors, occasions of nondetections are inevitable. A decision should be made whether or not to include the impact of these nondetections in the calculation of the mean impact over all incidents. This decision is heavily influenced by the objective͑s͒ in question, as demonstrated below.
First, consider Z 1 -the time to detection. If an incident is detected by a sensor, this detection will often occur within a few hours of the injection. However, there are many injection points on the periphery of a network that lead to small plumes that do not permeate the network and are never detected. When the impact of these nondetections are included in the calculation of the Z 1 objective, nonintuitive behavior ensues. Specifically, recalling that the analysis depends on extended period simulations, note that the impact of nondetections is very severe and dwarfs that of detections. Optimizing for minimum time to detection in the presence of nondetections means avoiding nondetections at all costs, and results in sensor placements that are directly correlated with those optimizing the number of failed detections ͑Z 4 ͒. In real terms, this means placing sensors far from the center of a network in order to maximize detections. This is exactly opposed to an intuitive approach for minimizing the time to detection. In order to avoid this nonintuitive behavior, it was decided to not include nondetections in the evaluation of objective Z 1 .
The situation was different for Z 2 , the population exposed. In the discussion above, it was shown that nondetections in the periphery of the system with very small real impact, were penalized severely in terms of the time to detection Z 1 , and could trick optimizers into selecting nonsensical solutions. With Z 2 , however, this pathology does not exist. A small incident that does not spread has small impact, no matter how long the simulation is run. Therefore, it does not disproportionately affect the solution. It is noted that including nondetections in this case would be desirable. In effect, doing so would improve Z 4 without requiring an explicit multiobjective solution. However, in the interest of a "clean" design of experiments, and noting that Z 1 does not make sense in the context of nondetections, it was chosen to evaluate Z 1 , Z 2 , and Z 3 without considering nondetections, and to challenge multiple objective solvers with the addition of Z 4 as a separate objective.
System's Properties
The experimental design in the BWSN was constrained by limitations on available datasets. Despite the size of Network 2, which is considered in this study as a complicated system, it is a fairly simple network that has properties unlike those of more complex networks. Some research teams on this proposal ͑e.g., Berry et al., 2006͒ have experience with the latter, and point out that these can be more challenging for sensor placement algorithms.
One example of a property that both Networks 1 and 2 share, but more complex networks might not, is that the average plume size over the possible set of injections was very small. This is due to the relatively simple structure of these network models, which have few pumps and a largely homogeneous flow pattern over a 24-h period. A simple analysis of the plume extent showed that the average injection in Network 2 contaminated roughly 2% of the network, and in fact, many injections contaminated closer to 0.2% of the network. Furthermore, these injections of small extent ware usually independent of the injection time since flow patterns did not change drastically from one time to the next. In a complex network with many pressure zones, both the expected plume size and the behavior of injections beginning at different times can be quite unlike those of Network 2.
Conclusions
This paper provides a summary of the BWSN ͑Ostfeld et al. 2006͒, the goal of which was to objectively compare the solutions obtained using different approaches to the problem of sensor placement in water distribution systems. Participants were requested to place five and 20 sensors for two real water distribution systems of increasing complexity and for four derivative cases, taking into account four design objectives: ͑1͒ minimization of the expected time of detection ͑Z 1 ͒; ͑2͒ minimization of the expected population affected prior to detection ͑Z 2 ͒; ͑3͒ minimization of the expected demand of contaminated water prior to detection ͑Z 3 ͒, and ͑4͒ maximization of the detection likelihood ͑Z 4 ͒. Fifteen contributions were received from academia and practitioners, spanning a range of approaches and computational methods ranging from pure heuristic engineering judgment to sophisticated mathematical optimization algorithms.
As the BWSN evolved, it became clear that the problem of sensor placements is multiobjective. As only compromised nondominated solutions can be defined in a multiobjective space, determination of the "best" received solution was not possible, but this assessment provided indications of breadth and similarity of findings, as desired using different mathematical algorithms.
From a practical perspective, the most practical conclusion that can be drawn is that general guidelines cannot be set. Engineering judgment and intuition alone are not sufficient for effectively placing sensors. Both engineering judgment and intuitive processes need to be supported by quantitative analysis. The analysis on both examples has shown that sensors do not need to be clustered and that placing sensors at vertical assets ͑sources, tanks, and pumps͒ is not a necessity. In fact, most of the designs have not placed sensors at vertical assets. In some cases ͑e.g., see Fig. 3͒ , there were considerable similarities where the same nodes ͑or nodes at a immediate vicinity͒ were selected by many of the methodologies.
Future Research Directions
The BWSN highlighted the following issues that need further consideration and research efforts:
Contamination Warning Systems Evaluation
For Network 1 the full event matrix ͑i.e., all possible injection times and locations͒ was utilized for one possible injection ͑Derivative Cases A, B, and C͒. For Network 2, the 25,054 random events matrix generated for Testing Case A was only a small portion of the entire space of possible injection events. Hence, generation of different event matrices will likely produce Berry et al. ͑2006͒ 636; 1,917; 3,357; 3,573; 3,770; 4,132; 4,240; 4,594; 5,114; 6,583; 6,700; 7,652; 8,999; 9,142; 9,722; 10,614; 10,874; 11,177; 11,271; 12,258 540 548 17,456 0.366 Dorini et al. ͑2006͒ 647; 928; 1,478; 1,872; 2,223; 2,848; 3,573; 4,650; 5,076; 5,366; 6,835; 7,422; 8,336; 8,402; 9,204; 9,364; 10,874; 11,271; 11,528; 12,377 915 1,325 90,255 0.401 Eliades and Polycarpou ͑2006͒ 532; 1,426; 1,486; 1,976; 3,231; 3,679; 3,836; 4,234; 4,359; 4,609; 5,087; 5,585; 6,922; 7,670; 7,858; 8,629; 9,360; 9,787; 10,885; 12,167 1,108 1,600 121,574 0.409 Ghimire and Barkdoll ͑2006a,b͒ 9,271; 1,486; 4,482; 5,585; 4,609; 4,359; 9,787; 532; 5,953; 12,341; 4,808; 4,662; 4,638; 3,864; 1,667; 3,806; 1,590; 7,858; 9,303; 12,220 1,090 1,924 189,281 0.300 Guan et al. ͑2006͒ 174; 311; 1,486; 1,905; 2,589; 2,991; 3,548; 3,757; 3,864; 4,184; 4,238; 5,091; 6,995; 7,145; 7,689; 8,826; 9,308; 9,787; 10,614; 12,086 645 966 43,585 0.308 Huang et al. ͑2006͒ 73; 108; 1,028; 1,112; 1,437; 2,526; 3,180; 4,036; 4,648; 5,363; 5,826; 5,879; 6,581; 8,439; 8,580; 8,841; 9,363; 9,616; 10,216; 10,385 829 1,264 78,533 0.342 Krause et al. ͑2006͒ 10,874; 4,684; 11,304; 3,357; 11,184; 1,478; 9,142; 1,904; 4,032; 9,364; 4,240; 4,132; 3,635; 2,579; 3,836; 6,700; 8,999; 3,747; 8,834; 3,229 665 699 27,458 0.397 Ostfeld and Salomons ͑2006͒ 2,872; 4,319; 4,782; 3,281; 8,766; 3,712; 11,184; 4,433; 22; 11,623; 8,560; 3,129; 9,785; 8,098; 10,734; 6,738; 7,428; 611; 7,669; 7,500 1,093 1,554 109,931 0.384 ͑2006͒ 5,420; 542; 12,505; 12,514; 12,509; 7,962, 7,469; 8,617; 3,070; 3,180; 11,314; 12,237; 6,390; 12,135; 1,795; 5,089; 4,892; 10,917; 3,817; 10 871; 1,334; 2,589; 3,115; 3,640; 3,719; 4,247; 4,990; 5,630; 6,733; 7,442; 7,714; 8,387; 8,394; 9,778; 10,290; 10,522; 10,680; 11,151; 11,519 850 1,353 77,312 0.420 different solutions. For Network 2 the research challenge is to identify procedures by which efficient sampling from the entire set of contamination events can be computed for a rare subset ͑i.e., a subset of events with a small probability to occur, but with an extreme impact͒, which will provide an "upper bound" ͑i.e., worst-case estimation͒ for contamination warning system evaluations.
Trachtman
Aggregation
Because the sensor placement problem rapidly becomes too complex to explore thoroughly, there would be great merit in developing a water-quality aggregation algorithm that can construct an "equivalent" but reduced network of a water distribution system, containing fewer nodes and links but matching both the hydraulics and the water quality of the original system.
Multiobjective Optimization
The study identified some correlations between objectives, and these correlations should inform future studies. In particular, the objectives Z 1 , Z 2 , and Z 3 are positively correlated with one another, and are negatively correlated with Z 4 . Stopping the damage from the average injection more quickly tends to decrease the population infected and the volume of contaminated water consumed, while maximizing the detection probability tends to generate more conservative sensor placements that tolerate slow detections. A greater multiobjective challenge for the future would be to select only one of Z 1 , Z 2 , and Z 3 , and then to compare the selection of representative "quick detection" to Z 4 , and possibly with objectives not closely related to either.
Selection of Number of Sensors
Since sensors involve significant capital and operational expenditures, research is needed to identify the marginal returns for additional sensors as guidance in establishing the number of sensors appropriate, for different water distribution networks.
Dual Use of Sensors
Sensors should comply with dual use benefits. Sensor locations and types should be integrated not only for achieving water security goals but also for accomplishing other water utility objectives, such as satisfying regulatory monitoring requirements or collecting information to solve water quality problems. Such an objective would be particularly interesting and likely to be highly correlated with security objectives.
Criteria for Identifying Areas of Higher Risk of Threat and Protection
In assessments to date, equal likelihoods of threat and need for protection have been employed. The reality is that particular em- phasis should be given to areas of greater threat and, equally likely, areas of likely greater need for protection, and methods to improve prioritization are definitely warranted.
Inclusion of Risk
In the BWSN, the assessments for the four design objectives were completed on the basis of expected values. There is substantial merit in considering risk inclusion as opposed to expected value. A sensor design should comply with its associated risk.
Sensor Reliability
In reality, the correct functioning of sensors is not guaranteed; both false positive and false negative rates need to be considered. The challenge is to develop methodologies for incorporating the uncertainty of sensor detections as part of the design process for sensor layouts and the extent to which action can be taken before there is confirmation that there is, indeed, a contaminant event.
Incorporation of Operational Conditions
Once sensors are placed they should address different operational conditions and account for problems such as providing data for identifying the location of the contaminant intrusion, and for implementing a containment procedure. Methodologies should be developed for incorporating in one framework both design and operational objectives.
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Notation
The following symbols are used in the paper: C ϭ hazard concentration threshold ͑mg/L͒; c ik ϭ contaminant concentration for node i and time step k ͑mg/L͒; D 50 ϭ dose that would result in a 0.5 probability of becoming infected or symptomatic ͑mg/kg͒; d r ϭ detection flag for the rth contamination scenario, receiving 1 if the rth contamination scenario is detected, and zero otherwise; E͑P a ͒ ϭ mathematical expectation of the affected population P a ; E͑t d ͒ ϭ mathematical expectation of the minimum detection time t d ; E͑V d ͒ ϭ mathematical expectation of V d ; M i ϭ mass ingested-prior to detection-by any individual at network node i ͑mg͒; N ϭ number of evaluation time steps prior to detection; P a ϭ population affected for a particular contamination scenario; P i ϭ population assigned to node i; q i ϭ average water demand at node i; q ik ϭ water demand for time step k and node i; R i ϭ probability ͓0, 1͔ that a person who ingests contaminant mass M i will become infected or symptomatic; S ϭ total number of contamination scenarios considered for computing Z 4 ; t d ϭ minimum sensors detection time; t j ϭ time of first detection at the jth sensor location; V ϭ total number of nodes ͑for calculating Z 2 ͒; V d ϭ total volumetric water demand that exceeds a predefined hazard concentration; W ϭ assumed ͑average͒ body mass ͑kg/person͒; Z 1 ϭ expected time of detection; Z 2 ϭ expected population affected prior to detection; Z 3 ϭ expected volume of consumed contaminated water prior to detection; Z 4 ϭ detection likelihood; ␤ ϭ probit slope parameter ͑unitless͒; ⌬t ϭ evaluation time step ͑days͒; ⌽ ϭ standard normal cumulative distribution function; ϭ mean amount of water consumed by an individual ͑L/day/person͒; and ik ϭ dose rate multiplier for node i and time step k ͑unitless͒.
